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Introduction
Is the economic value of a ﬁshery enhanced when exclusive property rights are deﬁned
and enforced? In the United States the legal authority to create such rights has existed since
the passage of the Magnuson-Stevenson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976.
Over the years property rights have been created to some – but not most – U.S. ﬁsheries. If
property rights are in fact critical to the economic viability of ﬁsheries, why then, despite a
legal framework designed to ease their creation, are most ﬁsheries still lacking even rudimentary
property rights?
This questions’ breadth suggests more questions than answers: A full accounting of the
determinants of property rights in ﬁsheries will be constructed from the answers to many
narrower questions. In this note I investigate whether there are important spatial and economic
characteristics of ﬁshery stocks that aﬀect the decision to establish property rights to ﬁsheries
managed under the Magnuson Act.
Literature Review
The general theory of property rights is well established (See Barzel 1989 and Libecap
1989). The creation of property rights is viewed as an economic decision because their de-
sign, monitoring, and enforcement consumes real resources. This view allows for a rational
reconstruction of the choice process using marginal analysis (Anderson and Hill 1975). Within
the marginal framework one can not, a priori, demonstrate the universal adoption of property
rights: The extent of property rights adoption will depend on the marginal costs and beneﬁts.
A core proposition of this literature holds that eﬀorts to create property rights will, ceteris
paribus, increase as either transaction costs fall or the value of resources increase. Empirical
investigations lend support to this proposition (See Demsetz 1967, Cheung 1970, Field 1989).
Several authors have incorporated these propositions into models of ﬁshery management.
Anderson and Lee (1986) show that positive transaction costs generate situations where ﬁshery
managers “failing” to fully enforce property rights may increase social welfare. Others have
come to similar conclusions (Milliman 1986, Sutinen and Andersen 1985, Anderson 1989.)– 2 –
Institutional Background
The Magnuson Act extended U.S. jurisdiction over marine resources from 12 to 200 nautical
miles. The Act authorizes three agencies to manage ﬁsheries in this 200–mile zone. Eight quasi–
independent regional ﬁshery management councils representing commercial, recreational, and
consumer ﬁshing interests, develop ﬁshery regulations that are presented to the Secretary of
Commerce in the form of Fishery Management Plans (FMPs). In turn, the Secretary either
approves or rejects each FMP. Much of this review process is delegated to the National Marine
Fishery Service, a sub–agency in the Department of Commerce, that, along with the United
States Coast Guard, enforce regulations contained in the FMPs. (For a detailed analysis of this
Act and the regulatory review process see Kincaid (1999)).
Construction of the Data Set
Drawing on data contained in these FMPs I developed a set of forty–ﬁve ﬁsheries to
serve as observations in my data set. My review of these plans revealed the existence of two
basic categories of property rights: Limited–entry programs and Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs). In the sample, entry is limited in twenty–one ﬁsheries. Sixteen ﬁsheries have permanent
limited–entry programs, while the remaining six have 5–year entry moratoriums. Four ﬁsheries
have individual transferable quota (ITQ) programs. ITQs assign a speciﬁc share of a ﬁsheries
harvest (the ‘quota’) to individual ﬁshermen who, in turn, may harvest this quota or transfer
it to others.
Each program creates rents by limiting access to a resource that was heretofore (essentially)
open to all takers. However, under limited–entry programs, these rents are unassigned and,
in the absence of other regulations (e.g. restrictions on vessel size), remain at risk because of
the strong incentive each ﬁsherman has to capture as large a share of the harvest as possible.
Thus, simple limited–entry programs run the risk of converting the problem of the ﬁshery from
one of too many ﬁshermen chasing too few ﬁsh, to one of a few ﬁshermen with too much gear
chasing too few ﬁsh. Because ITQ programs assign speciﬁc shares of the harvest to ﬁshermen,
these perverse incentives are dulled.
Notwithstanding these diﬀerences, each program confers some property interest and so, for– 3 –
this analysis, I treat their presence as an indication of property rights adoption. A binary vari-
able, rights, summarizes this fact; where zero indicates no property rights, and one indicates
some form of property rights adoption. rights serves as the dependent variable in a probit
model of the determinants of property rights.
The adoption of property rights hinges on a standard cost–beneﬁt calculation, where prop-
erty rights are adopted if the net beneﬁt is positive. The variable revenue, a three–year
weighted average of ex–vessel revenue (millions of 1995 dollars), proxies the beneﬁts of adop-
tion.
Four variables proxy transaction costs. vessels, the number of ﬁshing vessels in a ﬁshery,
proxies exclusion costs. ports, an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 4, proxies land–based
enforcement costs; where zero indicates a ﬁshery with between 1 and 20 landing sites, one
indicates 21 to 40, 2 indicates 41 to 60, 3 indicates 61 to 80, and 4 indicates 81 or more sites.
(Insert CORNES AND SANDLER REFERENCE) extent is an ordinal variable that
proxies at–sea enforcement costs. extent takes on the values 0, 1, and 2, and captures the
geographical extent of a ﬁsheries range. A value of zero denotes a ﬁshery with a ’small’ range,
1 denotes a ’middling’ range, and 2 denotes a ’large’ range1 Finally, part is an ordinal variable
keyed to the type of ﬁshermen found in a ﬁshery; a value of zero indicates a ﬁshery with mostly
full–time ﬁshermen, one indicates a mix of full and part–time ﬁshermen, and two indicates a
ﬁshery with mostly part–time ﬁshermen. part is motivated by the fact that ﬁsheries prosecuted
by full–time ﬁshermen is likely to be less susceptible to ‘hit–and–run’ tactics, are likely to have
more established norms of behavior, and other attributes which will tend to make monitoring
eﬀects more eﬀective (Wilen, Anderson, Cructhﬁeld...)
1This index is based on a location of ﬁshery. Fisheries found in a single management councils waters were
set to 0, ﬁsheries found in multiple council waters, but remained within the EEZ were set to 1, and ﬁsheries
found in international waters are set to 2.– 4 –
Empirical Model and Results
The following equation is estimated using probit methods,
Prob(rights=1) = α0 + β1 ∗ revenue+
β2 ∗ vessel + β3 ∗ extent + β4 ∗ port + β5 ∗ part (1)
This speciﬁcation allows for testing two hypotheses: Increases in revenue should increase
the probability of property rights adoption and increases in transaction costs, as proxied by
increases in vessels, ports, extent or part, should decrease the probability of adoption.
Table One summarizes the results of the probit estimation. Both coeﬃcient estimates and
marginal eﬀects (calculated at the mean of the independent variables) are presented. Overall
the speciﬁcation performs well: 91% of ﬁsheries not having property rights and 95% of those
with property rights are correctly classiﬁed. Each of the marginal eﬀects has the predicted
sign: transaction costs proxies enter with negative signs, while revenue enters with a positive
sign. In terms of statistical signiﬁcance only extent has a p-value greater than 0.1. A more
important question turns on the empirical signiﬁcance of the independent variables; that is to
say, the magnitude of each variable’s marginal eﬀect. Table 1:
Changes in the variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of adoption. A one million
dollar increase in revenue will, ceteris paribus, increase the probability of property rights
adoption by 1.5%. An increase of 100 vessels decreases the probability of adoption by 2.6%.
A unit increase in extent decreases the probability of adoption by 47%, a unit increase in
ports decreases the probability of adoption by 32%, and a unit increase in participation
decreases probability of adoption by 44%.
Because the marginal eﬀects are non–linear functions of the data, a more complete as-
sessment of their magnitudes requires one to calculate their values over a range of the other
variables values (See Greene 1999 for details.) For example, the impact of ports may be quite
diﬀerent in ﬁsheries with high levels of revenue compared to those with low levels. Fig. 1.—
To consider this question I use the probit coeﬃcient estimates to calculate the probability of
adoption as a function revenue and the mean values of extent and vessels. This results in
three distinct CDF’s; one for each value of ports and are plotted in Figure One. As illustrated
in ﬁgure one, the marginal eﬀect of ports is calculated as the diﬀerence between any two– 5 –
probability functions for a given level of revenue. As one can see, ports has a substantial
aﬀect on the probability of property rights adoption, but its magnitude depends substantially
on revenue. Table two summarizes the marginal eﬀect of ports for three diﬀerent values of
revenue. At the mean value of revenue ( 4.5 ), the probability of adoption falls 37% (from Table 2:
0.8 to 0.5) as ports increases from 0 to 1, and by 60% as ports increases from 1 to 2.
At low levels of revenue, changes in ports has a relatively small impact on the probability
of adoption. Except for ﬁsheries with more than 80 landing sites (ports = 2), the same can
be said for ﬁsheries with relatively high levels of revenue. Because most ﬁsheries are in the
central region of the distribution of revenue, the impact ports, and by extension, enforcement
costs, is likely to be an important factor aﬀecting the probability of property rights adoption.
This point is re–enforced when one considers that 42% of the ﬁsheries in my sample have more
than 80 ports.
Conclusion
The passage of the Magnuson Act was heralded as a historic shift away from traditional and
ineﬃcient regulatory management of ﬁshery resources to a system of management that would,
on the one hand, enhance ﬁshermen’s income by creating property rights to ﬁshery resources,
and on the other, preserve ﬁshery stocks though the stewardship that resource ownership aﬀords.
The fact that, 26 years after the Act’s passage, only a small number of ﬁsheries have some form
of property rights deﬁned has lead to disappointment in many quarters, and a search for answers
to why traditional management practices seem so entrenched.
The fact that my sample is one of convenience justiﬁes a cautious appraisal of my ﬁndings,
the results presented in this note suggest a partial explanation of why so few ﬁsheries are
currently managed using exclusive property rights: given the beneﬁts that they would confer,
the costs of deﬁning, monitoring and enforcing these rights may be too high.
This should not, however, be viewed as a Panglossian statement that ﬁsheries are managed
in the best of all possible worlds. The net beneﬁts of property rights are a function not just of the
characteristics of the ﬁshery stock, but also of the institutional structure of ﬁshery management
and the technology of monitoring and enforcing property rights. Changes in either could lead
to the further adoption of property rights.– 6 –
The limited ﬁndings in this note suggest that eﬀorts to more closely measure transaction
costs and correlate these costs with the incidence of property rights will be fruitful. The results
of such research would provide useful information to policy makers as they reassess the history
of ﬁshery management since the passage of the Magnuson Act and seek to better the economic
standing of both ﬁshermen and the resources that sustain them.– 7 –
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Tables
Variable Estimate Std. Error P–Value ME
(Intercept) 2.67600 0.857 0.0018 —
revenue 0.03432 0.015 0.0294 0.015
vessel −0.05777 0.031 0.0679 −0.026
extent −1.04378 0.640 0.1032 −0.473
port −0.71640 0.278 0.0099 −0.324
part −0.98607 0.444 0.0266 −0.447
Table 1: Results of the Probit Estimation. The ﬁnal column, ME, presents the marginal ef-






Table 2: Marginal Eﬀect of ports. Each marginal eﬀect is calculated for revenue one Std.
Dev. below its mean, at the mean, and one Std. Dev. above. ME01 is the marginal eﬀect of
ports as it increases from 0 to 1, ME12 is the marginal eﬀect of ports as it increases from 1
to 2.– 9 –
Figure Captions
Fig. 1.—. CDFs for each value of ports as a function of revenue. Tick marks above the
x–axis indicate observed values of revenue.– 10 –
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Fig. 1.— CDFs for each value of ports as a function of revenue. Tick marks above the
x–axis indicate observed values of revenue.